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NOTE AND COMMENT
LuBInTy ot' MANUFACTURR TO REMOT4 VNDE VOR D-EPcTIvz AuToWHtM.-Plaintiff. in February. 19O. purchased from the Utica

MOBILZ

Motor Car Company, a Cadillac six-passenger touring car, manufactured by
the Cadillac Motor Car Company, of Michigan. The Utica company was a
dealer in motor cars, and purchased to resell; it was the original vendee, and
the plaintiff was the sub-vendee.
The car was used very little until July 31, i909, when the plaintiff, an
experienced driver, while driving the car on a main public road in good
condition, at a speed of 12 to 15 miles per hour, was severely and permanently injured by the right front wheel suddenly breaking down and the
car turning over on him.

He commenced action in the Supreme Court of New York in I91O. This
was removed to the Federal Court for the Northern District of New York,
where he had judgment for $8,ooo. This was reversed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, (LaCombe, Coxe,' and Ward, JJ.), in an opinion by Ward, J,
Coxe, J., dissenting, (221 Fed. 8oi, I915).
The action was tried again, without a jury. The court found that the
injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant; that the plaintiff
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was free from contributory negligence; and that the damages amounted to
$io,ooo. Yet, relying on the former decision of the Court of Appeals, the
court gave judgment for the defendant. The court also found: that the
automobile was manufactured, assembled, and put on the market by the
defendant with a weak and defective wheel; that this was the proximate
cause of the accident; that the car when put on the market, was dangerous
to human life; that defendant ought to have knpwn this. and had it exercised ordinary care would have known it; that although the defendant did not
manufacture, but purchased, the wheels, it carelessly failed to use reasonable
inspection and tests to discover the real condition and weakness of the wheels.
The complaint was based on negligence only. There was no allegation of
adfraudulent representations by the defendant. Evidence, however, was
catalogue
its
in
defendant,
the
that
found,
judge
the
and
effect,
the
to
mitted
represented that its cars were equipped with the best wheels obtainable, equal
to those used on the highest priced cars; of the artillery type, made from
well seasoned second growth hickory, with steel hubs and spokes of ample
dimensions to insure great strength; and that the plaintiff relied on these
representations.
On the former appeal, the question was the same as here, i. e., whether
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, not being the immediate
purchaser, but the sub-vendee, and it was held that since there was no
contractual relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, there could be
no recovery. The court then said: "One who manufactures articles inherently dangerous, e. g., poisons, dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes, bottles of
water under gas pressure,-is liable in tort to third parties which they injure,
unless he prove that he has exercised reasonable care with reference to the
article manufactured. * * * On the other hand, one who manufactures articles
dangerous only if defectively made or installed, e. g., tables, chairs, pictures
or mirrors hung on the walls, or carriages, automobiles, and so on,--is not
liable to third parties for injuries caused by them except in case of willful
injury or fraud:'
On this appeal the defendant relied on the rule "that whatever has been
decided on one appeal cannot be re-examined on a second appeal in the
same suit." While the court admitted this was the general rule, yet, by
Rogers, J., it said this is a rule "of public policy of private peace," but not an
inexorable one, "and should not be adhered to in a case in which the court
has committed an error which results in injustice, and at the sanle time lays
down a principle of law for, future guidance which is unsound and 'contrary
to the interests of society. * * * We shall not consider at length the reasons
which have satisfied us that a serious mistake was made in the first decision.
The reasons may be found in the opinion in" MacPherson v. Buick Motof
Co., 2,7 N. Y. 382, decided since the former decision in this case. 'Wecannot believe that the liability of a manufacturer of automobiles has any analogy
to the liability of a manufacturer of tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors hung
on the walls. The analogy is rather that of the manufacturer of unwhole-"
some food or of a poisonous drug. It is every bit as dangerous to put upon
the market an automobile with rotten spokes as it is to send out to the
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trade rotten foodstuffs." (Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 Fed. 921). The
judgment was, therefore, reversed, Manton, J., concurring with Rogers, J.,
and Ward, J., dissenting, on the ground that the former decision was the
law of the case and was res judicata. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
(1919) 261 Fed. 878. The opinion of Ray, J., in the District Court (I94 Fed.
497), is valuable.
The history of this case illustrates the difficulty the courts have with the
problem involved. Beginning with Langridge v. Levy in x837. (2 M. & W.
51W. 4 M. & W. 337). D. who falsely warranted to P's father, who purchased

for use of himself and his sons, the make of a gun which burst and injured P while he was using it. was held liable to P. In Winterbottorn v.
Wright, (z842), io M. & W. iog, P, relying on a contract between D and
the Postmaster General to keep in repair, the mail coaches to be used by P's
employer who had contracted to carry the mails, was not allowed to recover
damages for an injury caused by the breaking down of the coach which P
was driving, due to D's failure to keep in repair as agreed. In Longmeid v.
Holliday, (85i), 6 Exch. 761, P could not recover for injury from the explosion of a defective lamp which P's husband had purchased for the use
of himself and his wife, from D who did not make the lamp, know of the
defect, or make any representations concerning it, although the husband had
an action against D on an implied warranty that the lamp was sound. IA
Thomas v. Winchester, (1852), 6 N.'Y. 397, P was allowed to recover for
injury from taking belladonna (poison), used in a prescription calling for
dandelion (harmless), filled by a retail druggist from a bottle falsely labeled
'dandelion,' purchased from a wholesale druggist, who bought from D, the
manfacturer, whose employee had negligently mislabeled the bottle,-on
the ground of the inherently dangerous character of the poisonous drug.
These are the foundation cases.
In Huset v. ThreshingMachine Co., (i9o3), i~o Fed. 865, Judge SANmom
xeviewed the cases, and formulated the matter thus: The general rule is that
the manufacturer is not liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the manufacture of the articles he handles.
There are three exceptions: (x) An act of negligence of a manufacturer.
which is imminently dangerous to life or health, committed in the preparation
of an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable
by third parties who suffer therefrom;-Thomas v. Winchester, supra. (2.)
An owner's act of negligence causing injury to one invited to use his defective
appliances on his premises makes him liable,-Heaven v. Pender, (1883), L.
R. xi Q. B. D. 503. (3.) One who delivers an article which he knows to be
imminently dangerous to life, to another without notice of its qualities, is
liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which might have been
reasonably 'anticipated. In this case the declaration alleged that P was injured by the breaking of the defective running board over the cylinder of a
threshing machine which D knew was unsafe when he sold the machine to
P's employer. This was held sufficient on demurrer,-but the court remarked
that on the trial P probably would fail to prove D actually knew of the
defect.
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The courts have not yet arrived at any consistent theory of liability. The
Cadillac and Buick cases, above, put the defective touring cars in the class
of inherently dangerous things, but a Ford car is not such in Oklahoma,
(Ford Motor Car Co. v. Livesay, (Okl., i916), 16o Pac. 9o). A folding bed
is dangerous in California, (Lewis v. Terry, (1896), 111 Cal. 39), but an
ordinary bed is not in New York, (Field v. Empire & Co., (1918), 166 N. Y.
S. 509). A buggy is not in New York, (dicta in Thomas v. Winchester,supra),
but is in Georgia, (Woodward v. Miller (i9o4), ii9 Ga. 618). Step-ladders
are both in New York and in Minnesota, (Miller v. Steinfcld, (1917), i6o
N. Y. S. 8oo; Schubert v. Clark Co., (1892), 49 Minn. 331).
The Schubert and Buick cases, however, go a long way in establishing a
rule that the maker of a thing to be used in a certain way, owes a legal duty to
all who in the natural and ordinary course of events will probably use it in the
way designed, to exercise reasonable care in its manufacture, proportioned to
the danger from its use if defective, and is liable to such as are injured, when
properly using it without knowledge of the defect, because of its defective
condition, "although the maker did not personally know of the defect, had
no contract with the plaintiff, did "not fraudulently deceive him, and the
thing was not inherently dangerous otherwise than because of the defect.
by
This approaches the principle stated by Baz'r, M. L, (but not agreed to
by
the other judges), in Heaven v. Pender, supra;--"Whenever one person is
every
that
another
to
regard
with
position
a
such
in
circumstances placed
did
one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he
those
to
regard
with
conduct
own
his
in
skill
and
not use ordinary care
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property
of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.'
The English courts still have difficulty with the problem. Earl v. Lubbock,
T. 533
[i9o], 1 K. B. 253 (a van); Blacker v. Lake & Elliot, (1912), io6 L. ; Bates
(a lamp); White v. Steadman [1913], 3 K. B. 340,-(a vicious horse)
v. Batey & Co., [I93], 3 K. B. 351, (ginger-beer bottle); British So. African

Co. v. Lennon, (i9i5), 85 L. J. (P. C.) 1i (poison cattle dip). H. L. W.

TRESPASS AND I PEAm WRoNG.-In the recent -case of
(Cal., May, igig), 19IPac. 642, the facts were that, in
Trueblood,
v.
Perkins
March, I912, the defendant, a surgeon, set the leg of the plaintiff, but as the
fracture did not heal satisfactorily "the defendant separated the surfaces of
the bone during the month of April, 1912, and again set the plaintiff's leg."
In a suit for malpractice, begun on April 9, 1913, it was held, that the cause
preof action "was not barred by the CoDE or PROcEDURE, Article 340, subd.-3,
from
tell
to
difficult
is
It
cases."
such
in
period
limitation
scribing a one year
the report of the case what the theory of the court was as to the cause of
action and the running of the statute of limitation, but it is evident that the
court must have considered this not a case of "continuous trespass," with the
old connotation of that term, but rather as a case of "repeated wrong," and
that the statute began to run not from March, 1912, when the leg was originally set, but from April, 1912, the date when it was negligently reset.
CoNTINuoUs
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The confusion of these two phrases, above quoted, has caused the courts
a great deal of trouble, but wherever the facts have been of such a nature as
to allow an initial wrong with continuing results to be differentiated from
an initial wrong aftdrwards followed by a new wrong, they have reached
the conclusion found in the Caifornia case. In the English case of
Clegg v. Dearden, (1848), 12 Ad. and El. (N.S.) 575, a'trespasser had broken
through a wall in a mine and, after the statute had run on the original trespass, water had run through the hole and injured the plaintiff. It was held
in an action on the case that there could be no recovery because leaving the
hole was not a continuous trespass but only the result of the initial trespass,
and the running of the statute had barred that trespass together with its
results. In the case of the National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co.,
(x885) 57 Mich. 83 the facts were identical with those in the English case
and the conclusion was the same. In the case of Gillette v. Tucker (rgo2) 67
Ohio St. Io6, a surgeon sewed up a sponge in a wound and left it there
until after the statute had run on the original negligence of sewing itin the
wound. The holding in this case, finally affirmed by the Ohio court in McArthur v. Bowers, (i9o5) 72 Ohio St. 656, was the same as in the cases of
injury to land, above cited. The injury caused by the sponge remaining in
the wound was held to be the result of the original wrongful act and not a
new wrong, and recovery was denied the plaintiff because the statute had run
on the original trespass. But in the -case of Perry County v. Railroad Co.
(1885), 43 Ohio St. 451, it was held that "each day's failure" to restore a
bridge destroyed by fault of the defendant "was a fresh breach of an obligation" so to do; i. e., the leaving the hole in the road was a "repeated wrong"
each successive day that it was so left.
In line with this last decision of the Ohio court it has recently been held
in Judd v. Blakeman (97), 175 Ky. 848, that each successive overflow of the
plaintiff's land, caused by the negligent construction of the defendant, gave
rise to a new cause of action, each successive overflow being treated as a
"repeated wrong." There was a similar holding on the same state of facts in
Scheurich v. Empire District Electric Co. (Mo., 1916), 188 S. W. ix4. In the
case of Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (i915), 86 Wash. 211, where there
was a continuous publication of a libel, each publication was held .to constitute a separate libel and therefore a "repeated wrong," for which a recovery
would -be had, even if more than the statutory period had elapsed since the
first insertion.
It would seem wise then to bring one's suit for "repeated wrong" rather
than for "continuous trespass," and this too whether the action be for an
injury to land, a wrong to the person or a slander to reputation. A more
extensive consideration of this subject will appear in a later issue of this
J.H.D.
Rxr w.

RPgXs$ ol PARTIcUA JOINT ToRT-Fzsos-EincT or RtSERVATION 01
STIPULATION RtSzaVING RIGHT Or AcTIoN AGAINST OTHas.-The problem indicated by the above heading is not so simple as when Judge Cooley wrote
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concerning it, "* * * and so a release of one releases all, although the release
expressly stipulates that the other defendants are not to be released." CooLiY,
To-Ts, [3d Ed.] 236. A very considerable following has been attracted to the
opposite doctrine, the latest convert being the Supreme Court of Ohio, which
recently overruled its former decisions on the subject, holding that the plaintiff could, by an express stipulation in a release to two joint tort-feasors, reserve her cause of action against those not named as releasees. Adams Express Co. v. Beckdth et al., 126 N. E. 300 (Ohio, i919) overruling Ellis v.
Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89.
The release of the comomn law is a technical affair, involving a seal and
particular words. Where a technical release, absolute in its terms and under
seal, is given to one of several wrong-doers it is quite uniformly held that it
is a good bar to an action against those not named in the release. The reason
for this is laid in the sanctity of the seal. It.cannot be controverted by
parol evidence. The law presumes the release was given in full satisfaction
for the injury and upon sufficient consideration. xIi Am. St. Rep. 282;
indivisible,"
Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138. The cause of action being one and
a release of one destroys it. This has been carried to its logical, if unsatisfactory conclusion, by holding that it is immaterial whether or not the one
released was in fact liable. Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394. But the standing of the absolute release under seal is believed not to be impregnable. In
Rosenbaum Grain Co. v. Mitchell, 142 S. W. i21, (Tex.), an intsrument under
seal, given on consideration of $4ooo, purporting to "release and forever discharge" a railroad company from all causes of action arising from certain
injuries received by the plaintiff and acknowledging full satisfaction of all
liability, was held not conclusive, and parol evidence was admitted to show the
intention of the parties in making the release. It was left to the jury to decide whether or not the release of all joint tort-feasors was intended. See
further El Paso and S. R. Ry. Co. v. Darr,93 S. W. 166 (Tex.) ; City of Covington v. Westbay, 156 Ky. 839.

Although the operation of an absolute release under seal is well-settled,

the effect to be given to a reservation of a right of action against those not
released is a moot point. By one line of authorities all are released, as the

reservation is considered repugnant to the spirit of the release and void,

because "* * * his own deed shall be taken most strongly against himself.'
This is the reasoning applied in Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md.
2 Co. LITT. § 376.
this view. As pointed out in the course of the opinion
for
case
6o, a leading
in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, the same result is reached by travelling several different roads: the cause of action for the injury, being one
and indivisible, a release of one releases all; one who receives release is
deemed to have committed the whole injury and to have satisfied the injured
party; conclusive presumption of release of all from the presence of a seal.
But the distinguishing feature of this class of cases, whether the instrument
considered is under seal or not, is that they adhere to the technical view of
the release and do not interpret it according to what must have been the
intention of the parties making it. McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176 (not
under seal) ; Seither v. Phila. Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397 (under seal); Flyn
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v. Manson, i9 Cal. App. 400 (not under seal); Ruble v. Turner, 2 H. & N.
(Va.) 38 (not under seal); Farmers' Savings Bank v. Aldrich, 153 Ia. 144
(not under seal); L. & N. Rr. Co. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257 (under seal); Ducey
v. Patterson,37 Colo. 216 (not under seal).
Where it has been sought to avoid the technical effect of a release to
one joint tort-feasor, the courts have been put to some ingenuity to find a
basis for their decisions. The most common solution is to treat a release
containing the reservation in question not as a release, but as a covenant not
to sue, which does not discharge the cause of action. When given to a sole
tort-feasor a covenant not to sue may be pleaded in bar of an action against
him to avoid circuity of action, but when there are two or more joint tortf.easors and the covenant is with one of them it does not operate as a release
either of the covenantee or the other tort-feasors. The former must resort
to an action for breach of covenant if he is sued. and the latter cannot invoke
the covenant as a bar. Chicago v. Babcock. 143 Ill. 318. It is stated that
in England a transaction in the form of an actual release, whether by deed or
accord and satisfaction, will be construed as being merely a covenant not to
sue it it contains an express reservation of the right to proceed against the
other wrong-doers. SAioND, Toa'rs, [2d Ed.] 74, citing Duck v. Mayeu,
(1892) 2'Q. B. 511; Bateson v. Gosling. (1871) L. R. 7 C. P. o. In Gilbert
v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455, the court reversed its former holdings and adopted
this view. It did not appear in that case whether or not the instrument was
under seal, but in Walsh v. Hanan, 87 N. Y. Supp. 930, the rule was applied
to such a release. See 16 HAnv. I. RoV. 529 for New York holdings. To the
same effect are Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203; Edens v. Fletcher, 79 Kan. 139;
Kropidlowski v. Pfisterand Vogel Leather Co., 149 Wis. 421. This doctrine,
though it undoubtedly leads to a result in accord with the intention of the
parties is at best an artificial rule of interpretation and has been criticized as
amounting to judicial legislation. See 24 YAu L. JoUa. 505, commenting on
the Dwy case.
Where effect is given to the reservation in a release, the damages of the
releasor, in his later suits against remaining tort-feasors, are reduced by the
amount received in consideration for the release. In Ellis v. Esson, supra, a
case involving trespass to real property, it was suggested that such pro tanto
reduction is possible only where the damages are subject to computation, as
in that case, but when they rest mainly in the discretion of the court and
jury a release to one would not be interpreted as a covenant not to sue but
as a technical release discharging all. Though this point was necessarily overruled by the later Wisconsin case cited above, wher a release with reservations was construed as a covenant not to sue in an action involving personal
injuries due to acid bums, it has found its way into other decisions. Matheson v. O'Kane, 21I Mass. gi. That this situation involves no real difficulty
was shown in City of Covington v. Wesibay, supra, where a release to one for
$750 was held no bar to an action against other joint tort-feasors though the
damages were conjectural, the action being for personal injuries. The jury
were instructed to find for the plaintiff only if the damage was in excess of
$750 and then to the extent of the excess only. This distinction is not
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generally taken and is criticized in Robertson v. Trammell, 83 S. W. 258
(Tex.); iii Am. St. Rep. 286.
One or two other doctrines that incline away from the technical view
might be examined. In Blackmer v. McCabe, 86 Vt. 3o3, it was said that a
release under seal discharges all, but when not under seal all are hot discharged unless it appears that payment has been made in full satisfaction
of the wrong done. In Missouri, where private seals have been abolished,
it is said that for a release to one to bar an action against other joint wrongdoers it must express full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim or declare a release
in express terms. See Judd v. Walker, 158 Mo. App. 156, in which effect was
given to reservation in a release. In both these jurisdictions it is probable
that a reservation of further actions is held to indicate that full satisfaction
has not been received. See Chamberlain v. Murphy, 41 Vt. iio. In Minnesota it seems that if an instrument is a release, it is a release of all, even
though a reservation is made, but if a covenant not to sue, it has no such
effect. Ann. Cases 1913-B 271, commenting on Musolf v. Duluth Edison Electric Co., io8 Minn. 369. A similar statement is made by the Massachusetts
court in Matheson v. O'Kane, supra, but exactly what constitutes a releise
in these states is difficult to define. It is clear, however, that something more
than the presence of a reservation of plaintiff's action against remaining tortfeasors is necessary to induce the court to construe the instrument as a covenant not to sue.
In the main opinion of the Dwvy Case a rule of interpretation is worked out
which seems more satisfactory than simply calling a release with reservation
of further actions against those not released, a covenant not to sue. It gives
effect to the intention of the parties without doing especial violence to the
common law idea of the release. The release in that case was under seal
and contained the reservation under consideration. Adopting the reasoning
in that case it is submitted that the ultimate test in considering the effect ta
be given to releases is the satisfaction of the injured party. It is true that
he is entitled to but one satisfaction, but some courts, in their anxiety to apply
this rule have often precluded the attainment of full satisfaction for the
wrong done. A release is of no peculiar value except as it is an indication of
the receipt of satisfaction, and whether there has been full satisfaction should
be determined from the language used by the parties in the instrument. The
old rule recognized a satisfaction in law-from the presence of the seal. Consistently with this doctrine, reservations of further rights of action were considered repugnant to the release and void. The necessity for so holding
when the instrument is unsealed is difficult to see, though that result has been
reached in a number of cases cited above. It is doubtful if it is a necessary
consequence of the presence of the seal, even where a seal is held to furnish
conclusive proof of full satisfaction. This "conclusive proof" should not go
beyond the words of the instrument. When the release is absolute, no question can arise; but the presumption should in all cases go only to the discharge the instrument by its terms -makes. Where it expressly reserves further rights of action, the presumption of satisfaction may very well be conclusive so far as the releasee is concerned, but it is doing violence to the in-
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tention of the parties as expressly set forth to allow the seal to import full
satisfaction against the other wrongdoers. This is substantially the position
of the court in the Dwy case, which is approved in the principal case, with
extended quotations. The Ohio court says that written releases are to be
treated as contracts between the parties, stating. "There is nothing peculiar or
exceptional about contracts of release, or contracts not to sue or contracts
to cease prosecuting a suit. They are presumably to be construed, if in
doubt, by the same rules of arriving at the intention of the parties as any other
kind of contract." For recent collections of cases with annotations and comment see 92 Am. St. Rep. 872; 111 Am. St. Rep. 28; CHAPIN, ToRTs, (1917)
L. E. W.
§ 37.
L a, WITHOUT INT4NT.-Cases like the one put to the jury by Lusk, J. in
Harrison v. Smith. 20 L. T. at p. 71.5 that "If the character had been purely
imaginary, a creature of fancy, then, although it turns out that the plaintiff
bears the name of the fictitious character, it would not be a libel at all" fairly
raise the question whether or not intent is an essential element of a libel.
This question is, without hesitancy, answered by law writers in the negative.
ODnGns, LIBe-,AND SIANDSR, [5th Ed.] p. 4; Whiting v. Carpenter (Nebr.,
i9o3) 93 N. W. 926; Sisler v. Mistrot (Tex., 1917) 192 S. W. 565; Nash v.
Fisher,24 Wyo. .535.542. But what is meant by "intent"? The term is used
in various senses. It may denote an. exercise of the will-power such as is
requisite to constitute a voluntary act. -When the term is used in this sense,
intent is not essential to the tort under discussion, for a lunatic is liable for
libel. Ultrich v. N. Y. Press Co., 5o N. Y. Supp. 788, Dickinson v. Barber, 9
Mass. 225.
If by "intent" is meant a design to produce certain results, the question of
the essentiality of malice is presented. Upon this question there has been
much confusion in the decisions, but "the different views, while the cause of
much cont-oversy and misunderstanding, do not in fact create divergence in
the substantive law of defamation, as their ultimate effect is identical:' 25
Cyc. 372. The "ultimate effect" referred to is that if the publication. is not
justified by proof of its truth or by the privileged occasion of its publication,
malice need not be proved to recover compensatory damages. 25 Cyc. 374;
Sisler v. Mistrot, supra. Hence, it is no defense that the defendant did not intend to injilie the plaintiff (Curtiss v. Mussey, 6 Gray (Mass.) 261, 273;
Nash v. Fisher, supra; Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643)' for every person is
presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his
own acts. Morris v. Sailer, (Mo., 1911) 134 S. W. 98; Hamlin v. Fanti, 118
Wis. 594.
In a still different sense, the question of "intent" arose in the recent case
of Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., (N. Y., 1920) i26 N. E. 26, viz., whether
or not there must be ap intent to publish "of and concerning" the plaintiff.
In this case, the defendant had published a novel supposing the haines used
and contents to be purely fictitious, but, in fact, part of the book constituted
a libelous attack upon the plaintiff, describing him as one "Cornigan." The
court, in holding defendant liable, irrespective of the question of intent to
publish "of and concerning" the plaintiff, quoted from Holmes, J. in Peck v.
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Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, "If the publication was libelous, the defendant
took the risk. As was said by Lord Mansfield, 'whatever a man publishes, he
publishes at his peril."'
A somewhat different question was decided in Hanson v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 159 Mass. 293, where the plaintiff's name was mistakenly used in a
libelous news item. In considering the question of intent, the court said that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show to whom the defendant intended to
apply his remarks, citing Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137; Goodrich v.
Davis, ii Metc. 473, 480, 484, 485; Miller v. Butler,6 Cush. (Mass.) 71.
The case of Smith v. Ashley, ii Metc. (Mass.) 367, was, in its facts,
almost identical with the CorriganCase, and the court held the publisher not
.liable because he had no knowledge that the story referred to any existing
person; hence, no intent to publish "of and concerning" the plaintiff. The
court said, "To charge the defendant, it must be proved that he published
the libel wrongfully, and intentionally, and without just cause or excuse."
In accord with the Corrigan Case is the leading English' case of Hulton
& Co. v. Jones, [igio] A. C. 2o, where the decision rested on the principle
that the law looks at the tendency and consequences of the publication, not
at the intention of the publisher. Said Lord Loreburn, L. C., on p. 24, "He
(defendant) cannot show that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he never heard of the plaintiff. His intention * * * is inferred from what he did. His remedy is to refrain from defamatory words."
Fletcher Moulton, L. J., dissented, saying, "It is, to my mind, settled law
that a defendant is not guilty of libel * * * unless he intended (the defamatory writing) to refer to the plaintiff." See articles supporting the majority,
6o U. or PA. L. Rzv. 365, 461; 23 H-Av. L. Rv. 218; supporting the minority, 58 U. or PA. L. Rzv. i66-i69; 25 LAw QuArr. RPv. 341. The English
case differs from the CorriganCase and Smith v. Ashley in that both the publisher and the author of the novel intended and supposed it to be purely
fictitious, both as to names and contents, whereas in the Corrigan Case and
Smith v. Ashley the author apparently intended to attack the plaintiff. But
this difference seems immaterial, because the intent of the author would not
be imputed to the publisher anyway.
It is indisputable that Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., supra, is overwhelmed by contrary authorities of other jurisdictions. See Taylor v. Hearst,
io7 Cal. 262; Hulbert v.'New Nonpareil Co., ii Iowa 49o; Peck v. Tribune
Co. 214 U. S. 185; Every v. Evening Pub. Co., 144 Fed. 916. And it seems
that if "intent" is not essential to liability for defamatory publications when
the term is used to denote "an exercise of the will power" (see supra) nor
when it denotes "a design to produce certain results" (also supra), it is an
inconsistency in principle to hold that intent to publish "of and concerning"
the plaintiff is essential tQ the liability of the defendant. It is worthy of
notice that the Massachusetts decisions are inconsistent inter se in this respect. Cf. Smith v. Ashley (1846) supra, Curtis v. Mussey (i856) supra, and
L. K.
Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co. (1893), supra.
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-A group of very recent cases, representative no doubt of many others pending, involve an interesting and important question as to the construction of
military and naval service clauses in life insurance policies. These clauses
which have been common in policies, at least in those issued in the last few
years, while varying in wording-and these variations may be vitally important,-provide in general that if the insured meets death while engaged in
military or naval service the liability of the insurer shall be limited to the
premiums paid, unless permission to engage in such service shall have been
obtained from the company and an extra payment made.
The question which has troubled the courts has been whether recovery
of the full amount of the insurance should be denied if it appears merely
that the insured died while in service, or if the company escapes such liability
only when it appears that service caused death. In other words, does the
provision in question raise simply a question of status? or does it involve
the more troublesome problem of caumtion? The large .number of deaths
at the camps and even abroad from the influenza epidemic and other common diseases to which civiliahs were by no means immune has already resulted in a number of reported decisions.
At the outset there may be placed on one side those policies where the
wording expressly requires for exemption from full liability a causal relation
between the service and death. Such a.case was Kelly v. Fid. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., (Wis.) 172 N. W. 152 (1919), where the insured was killed while riding
a motorcycle in the performance of his duties as supervisor of construction
and operation of sawmills, ioo miles back of the front in France. The policy
contained provision that "If insured shall * * * engage in any military or
naval service * * * and shall die within two years of the date of this policy as
a result, directly or indirectly, of engaging in such service or work," the
liability of the company should be limited to return of premiums paid. The
court concluded that the military service was not the cause of death, the
deceased not having been exposed to any more hazard than any other motorcycle rider, and that the company was therefore not liable for the full sum.
So also Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., (Mo. App.) 213 S. W. 877 (igig), where
the insured died while at Jefferson Barracks "of accidental gunshot wound
in abdomen, in line of duty." The court held there was no proof that death
was the "result of such service." The only question about these cases is
whether there was not really a causal connection between service and death.
It is probably safe to say that if the insured in both these cases had been
killed while doing what they were in the course of an employment and questions had arisen whether the injuries had arisen "out of" such employment
so as to be covered by the usual Workmen's Compensation Act, it would
have been held that there was sufficient causal relation. See i6 Mici. L. RPv.
179; 17 MICH. L. Rxv. 28o. Of course in these compensation cases the natural
tendency is to make the Act inclusive, while in the insurance cases there
surely is no disposition normally to let out the company, the rule of construction is properly against it. The above cases, however, hardly turned on
construction.
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The tendency to construe insurance contracts strictly against the insurer
is well shown by Redd v. American Central Life Ins. Co.. 2oo Mo. App. 383
(igi8). The application there read "That active service in the army or navy.
in time of war, shall invalidate said contract of insurance, unless a permit,"
etc.; and the policy provided: "In case of death from service in war without
permission from the company, the full reserve for this policy at the time of
such death only will be paid." The court (Elison P. .. dissenting) concluded that the insured, who had died of pneumonia while stationed at Fort
Riley, was not in "active service."
In Miller v. Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n.. (Ark) 212 S. W. 310 (i0io), the
policy provided that recovery was to be limited to amounts actually paid to
company if death occurred "while in the service of the Army or Navy of the
government in time of war." In an opinion by McCullough, C. J.. the court
held that these words referred to the period of time during which the insured
was in service in the army and therefore since the insured died of pneumonia while at camp after induction into the army recovery should be limited
to the premiums paid. This case was distinguished in Benh am v. American
Central Life Ins. Co.. (Ark) 217 S. W. 462 (io2o). where the provision-in
the policy limited recovery to the reserve thereon if death occurred "while
engaged in military or naval service in time of war, or in consequence of
such service." Stress was placed on the word "engaged." The court (Smith,
J., dissenting, and McCullough, C. J., not participating) said "word 'engaged'
denotes action. * * * So here the words 'death while engaged in military
service in time of war' mean death while doing, performing, or taking pait
in some military service in time of war; in other words, it must be death
caused by performing some duty in the military service." The insured having contracted influenza while en route from Cornell University, where he had
been sent for special training, to Camp Dick to await assignment, from which
he died, the court concluded the full amount of the policy was recoverable.
Again in Nutt v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, (Ark.) 218 S. WV.675,
where the insured died of influenza contracted in camp, the court held (McCulloch, C. J. and Smith, 3., dissenting) the Benham Case controlling, the
policy in the later case containing language almost identical with that in the
earlier.
In Myli v. American Central Life Ins. Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, (N. D.)
172 N. W. 631 (igig), a similar ruling had been made by the Supreme Court
of North Dakota. Though the court seemed ready to decide that way on the
wording of the clause under consideration-the policy.here, as in the last
two Arkansas cases, contained the word "engaged"--other provisions in the
policy were also relied upon to sustain the conclusion. There were provisions
for payment of $4ooo in the event of the death of the insured * * * while this
policy is in full force, by bodily injury effected exclusively by external accidental means, not including * * * nor resulting from military or naval service
in time of war," etc., and for payment of benefits in case of disability, with an
exception of certain injuries for which benefits were not to be paid as follows:
"Excluding * * * injuries resulting from military or naval service in time of
war." It was argued that since these provisions clearly made mere status no
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ground for limited liability, it could not have been so intended in the clause
on which the case turned, and to hold otherwise would lead to the obviously
absurd result of allowing in a possible case a recovery of $4ooo for death of
insured by accident while in service where such service was not a cause, and
a refusal of recovery even as to the $2ooo, the face of the policy, if the insured
while' in service died of natural causes to which conditions of service did not
contribute.
In the latest case, Reid v. American Nat. Assurance Co., (Mo. App.)
218 S. W. 957 (Feb. 28, z92o), where the policy contained the usual provision, "* * * if the insured shall die * * * while engaged in naval or military
service in time of war," etc., the court in reversing the lower court said:
"There is nothing in this policy contract warranting the instruction that in
order to escape military liability there must be a finding, not only that the
deceased was engaged in military service at the time of his death, but that
such death was in consequence of such service." The court cites, in addition
to a few of the cases above, L,aRue v. Kansas Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 Kan. 539,
and Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. 34, but netiher of these cases
sheds any light on the precise question here considered.
In most, if not all, of these cases it might be reasonably urged that service
conditions, particularly exposure and crowded camps with inadequate health
facilities, had caused or at least contributed to the illness and death. Probably there are available somewhere data showing whether the men in service
ran greater risks than did civilians. In the cases above, however, there is not
manifested a disposition to inquire very particularly along these lines.
There are other insurance cases which may fairly be cited in this connection. In Graves v. Knights of Maccabees, gg N. Y. 397 (igzo), there was
involved a by-law of defendant providing: "No person shall be eligible for
membership in the Order who is engaged either as principal, agent or servant
in the manufacture or sale of * * * liquors as a beverage, and should any
beneficial member of the order engage in any of the above prohibited occupations after his admission, his benefit certificate shall become null and void,"
etc. The insured had formed a partnjership with his son to conduct a saloon
business, but, though insured lived in same house, he took no part in handling
the business. The insurance was held avoided, rejecting argument that there
was no avoidance unless insured actually and physically participated so as
to be subject to special hazards. The court sid it was defendant's privilege
to determine what risks it would run and it evidently thought these were
moral or physical hazards in the prohibited businesses. It was further said
there was no case cited controlling the point, and the "issue may seem somewhat close." Rule of the case was applied in Rauber v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
See also Sovereign Camp of Woodmhen of the
156 App. Div. 446 (913).
World v. Akins, (Tex., 1920) 219 S. W. 492.

In the field of fir6 insurance there are questions sufficiently like the one
under consideration to make the decisions thereof applicable. In Thuringia
Ins. Co. v. Norwaysz, 1o4 Ill. App. 390 (19o2), in an action on a fire insurance

policy it appeared that in violation of a provision therein the insured had
kept gasoline on the premises. It was held that there was no liability, though
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there was no showing that the presence of the gasoline either caused or contributed to the fire. "Nor is it necessary to show in order to maintain a
defense upon a pol4y like the one in controversy, that the fire occurred by
reason of the violation in such respect of the terms of the policy. The question is whether the condition of the policy has been violated:' Citing Turnbull v. Home Fire Ins. Co., x63 N. Y. 237. So also Bastian v. British American, Etc. Co., z43 Cal. 287 (i9o4), the court saying '"fit were incumbent on
the insurer in each case to prove that the fire was caused by dynamite being
bn the premises, it would render the clause in most cases of no affect;" Kensfick-Hammond Co. v. Fire Ins. Soc., 205 Mo. 294 (I9O7); Boyer v. Fire Ins.
Co.,

124

Mich. 455 (semble).

It would seem, then, that the holdings of the courts in these cases turning
on the military service clause that a causal relation between the service and
death must be shown in order to warrant a denial of recovery of the full
amount are out of harmony with the decisions in cases fairly analogous. If
there were real occasion for, construction, of course it would be proper to
resolve the doubt against the company in favor of the insured. It is submitted that in these cases there has been no room for such construction, not
even with the word 'engaged.' To require the insurer to show a causal
connection between the service and death would be to open the door to
inquiries which in many cases could not be satisfactorily answered and would
impose a burden on the company which as said by the California court in the
Bastian Case, supra, "would render the clause in most cases of no effect."
R W. A.
STocx DrvmzNDS AND THE FEDERA, Iz;cOMn TAx.-A question which has
interested the legal profession and those of the public owning stock in prosperous corporations has recently been decided by the Federal Suprtme Court.
It was held, four justices dissenting, that stock dividends are not taxable as
income.

Eisner Y. Macomber, -

U. S.

-

(i92o) 40 Sup. Ct. i89. The tax

in question was assessed under the Federal Income Tax Law of qig6, which
provided in Part I, § 2, (a) :--"That the term 'dividends' as used in this title
shall be held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by a
corporation * * * out of its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or
in stock of the corporation * * *, which stock dividend shall be considered
income, to the amount of its cash value." The court held this section invalid
as contrary to Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3, of the Constitution, which provides that
all direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to
population, the court deciding that the word 'income' in the Sixteenth Amendment did not include stock dividends notwithstanding the construction Congress attempted to put upon the word.
Although four members of the court dissented, two of those four differed
from the majority only on the construction of the word 'income' as used in
the Sixteenth Amendment. The other two justices differed radically from the
majority on the question of the nature of a stock dividend, taking the position
that there was no difference between a dividend in cash and a dividend in
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stock. There is considerable authority for this position. In the case of Tag
Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 52, a stock dividend was held to be taxable as income, the court stating at p. 535 ;-"It was the issuance to the stockholder of a new thing of value, transferable, transmissible, and salable separate and apart from that which before he had possessed." It is worth noting
that this statement was by the.highest court of the state which has given the
name to the rule that stock dividends are capital and not income as between
life tenant and remainder man. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. Ioi. See also 13
MICH. L. Rzv. 242; i8 MicE. L. Rxv. 69.
A recent appeal case from Australia also supports the theory of the dissenting justices. It was held in Swan Brewery Co., Ltd., v. Rex, [1914] A.
C. 231, under a statute putting a tax on 'dividends,' that a transaction, whereby certain surplus was charged to capital account and new shares issued pro
rata to stockholders, was a 'dividend' and taxable under the act. "There can
be no doubt that the new shares were distributed and were not the same
things as the old ones." Id. p. 235. In both this case and the Putnam case,
supra, the,.courts make the comparison between a 'straight' stock dividend
and an optional 'cash-for-stock' dividend on which Justice Brandeis places
great stress in the instant case. The court says,-"Had the company distributed the (money) among the shareholders and had the shareholders repaid such sums to the company as the price of the * * * new shares, the duty
on the (money) would clearly have been payable. Is not this virtually the
effect of what was actually done? I think it is." Swan Brewery Co. case,
supra, p. 236. This argument is plausible but it must be borne in mind that
there is the same difference between such an optional 'cash-for-stock' transaction and a straight stock dividend that there is between the latter and a
cash dividend. Moreover, such 'cash-for-stock' dividends are anything but
straightforward transactions and have a tendency to deceive the stockholders
and to take advantage of their ignorance or need of ready~money. Since the
price at which the new stock is offered is necessarily less than the actual
value, (otherwise the scheme would not be workable), such an arrangement is
well calculated to squeeze out the small stockholders and puts a premium on
'inside' knowledge. If the increase in stock is bona-fide there is no reason
why any such optional arrangement should be made.
There are many reasons for believing that a stock dividend is essentially
different in kind from a cash dividend. "It is the characteristic feature of a
stock dividend that the property of the corporation itself remains unchanged,
but that each bne of the shares of the increased capital stock represents a
smaller fractional interest than before in the total amount of the corporate
property. On the other hand it is the characteristic feature of a dividend declared and paid wholly from the net profits or undivided earnings that it does
diminish the property of the corporation by exactly the amount of the dividend so paid out, while it leaves the fractional interest represented by each
share of the capital stock exactly what it was before." Gray v. Hemenway,
212 Mass. 239, 241, citing Gibbons v. Mahon, x36 U. S. 549. "A stock dividend
gives the stockholder merely the evidences of additions made by the corporation to its own capital. He can, it is true, still retain the old stock certificates
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and sell the new ones, but by so doing he parts with so much of his interests
The
in the capital of the corporation." DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309, 314.
court states the proposition forcibly in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, (holding stock dividends not taxable as income under the Law of 1913). The
court says, at p. 426,--"* * * if certificates for $xooo par were split up into ten
certificates each, for $1o0, we presume that no one would call the certificates
income. What has happened is that the plaintiff's old certificates have beeri
split up in effect and have diminished in value to the extent of the value of,
the new."

A leading text-writer on this subject says that income *** is not synonygood
mous with 'increase.' The value of corporate stock may be increased by
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Another writer expresses his view of the subject in a novel manner. "No
one had the temerity to use this expression about a stock dividend-it is nothing at all * * * just like receiving five ones for a five-dollar bill." MoNTGompp. 214, 215,-xRiy, INCOmn TAX PRocwuS, p. 188. He proceeds to explain,
.of the
proportion
greater
a
had
stockholder
the
that
"It cannot be shown
company's net worth than before; it cannot be shown that the company distributed one dollar of its assets-the whole strength in the argument lies in
the statement that he has a piece of paper which recites that he has become
possessed of a certain specific part of the corporation's new capital stock,
that it is now called capital on the books, whereas shortly before it was called
surplus, and that said surplus account having once been divided it can never
be divided again, so he is on notice that he will not get another dividend from
the same surplus. * * * We are reduced to an examination of one argument,
viz., that so long as the amount of the dividend was in surplus account it
might be dissipated, and that it was more secure when called capital stock.
* * * As a matter of fact the argument is so weak that it falls with its own
weight. * * * There is no such thing as dissipation of surplus; if dissipation
is going on it is of assets, and bad management in dissipating assets goes on
regardless of whether there is a surplus account on the books or whether
the assets being dissipated represent capital stock."
If the majority of the court was correct in its conclusion on this point,
and the authorities cited supra seem to support it, the court's construction of
the word 'income! in the Sixteenth Amendment was certainly justified. The
Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the power of taxation to new or excepted subjects, but merely removed the occasion for apportioning taxes on
income among the states. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165. There is nothing in the wording of the amendment which should cause the courts to abandon its own prior definitions of 'income.' "Whatever difficulty there may be
about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports * * * some-
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thing entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation
or as a measure of the tax**

*"

Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S.

i79, 185.
Similar definitions of income were approved by the court long before the
decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, and Trust Co., i58 U. S. 6oi, which
reversed the previous holdings that an income tax was an excise tax and so
made necessary the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment before the present
Income Tax Law could be enacted. Under the Income Tax Iaw of 1867, the
increased value of bonds over their cost price was held not to be income.
Gray v. Darlington, x5 Wall. 63. A federal court, in construing the Income
Tax Law of i87o, stated: "In the absence of any special provision of law to
the contrary, income must be taken to mean money, and not the expectation
of receiving it, or the right to receive it, at some future time." U. S. v.
Schillinger, 14 Blatch. 71. It may perhaps be said that the court in the principal case showed little regard for the interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment favored by the legislative branch of the government, but it can hardly
be denied that the ultimate interpretation of the Constitution is for the judicial, and not the legislative department of government.
It was contended by the government in this case that since Congress could
tax the increased assets as income to the corporation, therefore it should be
considered as income to the stockholder. This is in effect to urge double
taxation, not as an anomaly to be tolerated, but as a principle to be followed
as of right. On the contrary the fact that Congress might conceivably tax
this same increased value in a different way is one very good reason for not
R. L. C.
*taxingit in this way.

